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LESSONS FROM EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSER DOCTRINE: 
CHALLENGING SEX-SPECIFIC APPEARANCE AND DRESS CODES 
DEBORAH ZALESNE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Employers seeking to enhance their corporate brand or to foster a 
professional business environment frequently mandate that employees adhere 
to personal appearance requirements while at work. These requirements often 
regulate everything from dress and grooming habits to personal hygiene. 
Though appearance codes are generally based on stereotypical assumptions 
about how men and women are supposed to look and act, courts tend to 
acknowledge their validity out of deference to employers’ business judgment.1 
Thus, employers are permitted under the law to require male employees to be 
clean shaven and to have short hair,2 to ask male employees to wear suits and 
ties,3 and to require female employees to wear skirts, dresses, or even high-
heeled shoes and makeup.4 Employers can also lawfully prohibit visible tattoos,5 
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would like to thank Professors Michael Jaffe, Ruthann Robson, and Rick Rossein for their insightful 
comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank my colleagues on the panel, 
as well as the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy for sponsoring this symposium, and Anthony 
Cardoso, Juliette Forstenzer and Cara Moore for their invaluable research assistance. 
 1. See infra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
 2. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998) (upholding a 
policy applying different hair length standards to male and female employees), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1000 (1998); Knott v. Mo. Pacific R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (upholding a policy 
requiring male employees to keep sideburns neat and well-trimmed and prohibiting “pork chop” 
side burns and long hair on men, noting that, although female employees had to conform to other 
dress standards, the differences in the policy toward male and female employees were “minor” and 
“reasonable,” reflecting “customary modes of grooming”); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 
(9th Cir. 1974) (upholding a company policy requiring men—but not women—to wear their hair 
short because the discrimination was not based on an immutable characteristic). 
 3. See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding a 
policy requiring male employees to wear ties, though female employees did not have to comply with 
a similar requirement, as the requirement was not “overly burdensome” and simply “serve[d] to 
extend an image to its customers which Safeway believe[d] [was] beneficial to its business”). 
 4. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that a 
policy requiring female employees to wear makeup, stockings, and colored nail polish was 
permissible where male employees’ appearance was similarly restricted); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 
766 F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding no Title VII violation where employer required plaintiff, a 
female news anchor, to alter her clothes and makeup based on negative responses from audience 
focus groups because employer treated male news anchors similarly). 
 5. See, e.g., Baldetta v. Harborview Med. Ctr., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13939 (9th Cir. June 11, 
1997) (upholding employer’s ban on tattoos even where the plaintiff’s tattoo identifying him as HIV 
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body piercings, unconventional hairstyles such as dreadlocks, cornrows, and 
braids,6 and impose weight requirements.7 
Although many courts treat employer-mandated appearance codes as 
“legally insignificant” and have long tolerated them,8 the weight of literature 
and theory on the subject, as well as the intensity and frequency with which 
employees challenge them through litigation,9 indicate that seemingly trivial 
dress codes can actually have important implications for autonomy and gender 
equality in the workplace. Far from trivial to some people, dress codes present 
the dual problem of preventing some employees from expressing their core 
sense of gender identity, while simultaneously reinforcing hidden prejudices 
embedded in social norms. 
Under the widely-adopted “unequal burdens” test from Frank v. United 
Airlines, a policy that has different grooming and appearance requirements for 
men and women is permissible, as long as it imposes equal burdens on males 
and females and does not limit the employment opportunities of only one sex.10 
Under this test, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit as recently as April 2006,11 if a 
dress code is equally offensive to men and women, it will still be permissible 
since it does not discriminate against only one sex. Sex-specific appearance 
codes requiring, for example, men to wear ties and women to wear skirts, both 
 
positive arguably addressed a public health concern); Inturri v. City of Hartford, 365 F. Supp. 2d 240 
(D. Conn. 2005) (permitting the city police department to order personnel to cover offensive or 
unprofessional tattoos); Riggs v. City of Fort Worth, 229 F. Supp. 2d 572, 582–83 (N.D. Tex. 2002) 
(permitting a requirement that a police officer with tattoos all over his body wear long pants and 
long sleeves during work, even though he consequently suffered from heat exhaustion and had to be 
moved to a desk job). 
 6. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting a Costco 
employee’s request for exemption from the employer’s ban on body piercings because of her 
involvement in the Church of Body Modification, finding the restriction was justified based on 
customer preference and where Costco had made reasonable accommodation to allow the employee 
to cover her piercings), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1131 (2005); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 
229, 232–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding policy which prohibited both women and men from wearing 
hair in cornrows did not violate Title VII on grounds of sex or race); Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., 
No. C80-222A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14562 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 1981) (upholding employer policy 
prohibiting female employee from wearing hair in cornrows); Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. 
Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding policy prohibiting plaintiff from wearing hair in dreadlocks 
legally permissible). 
 7. See, e.g., Horton v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. C-93-0225-VRW, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4265, at 
*16 (D. Cal. March 27, 1998) (finding employer’s use of weight tables not inherently discriminatory). 
 8. Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community 
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2580 (1994). Dress and appearance codes have 
“long been tolerated under the auspices of ‘managerial discretion’ or a business’ attempt to establish 
corporate image, attract customers, or ensure health and safety standards are met.” Serafina Raskin, 
Sex-based Discrimination in the American Workforce: Title VII and the Prohibition Against Gender 
Stereotyping, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 247, 247 (2006). Dress codes are especially tolerated when 
they regulate non-immutable characteristics such as hair length: “From the courts’ perspective, it is a 
minimal intrusion upon the employee’s personal autonomy to get a simple haircut.” Sandi Farrell, 
Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game: A Critique of the Ideology of Voluntarism in Title VII 
Jurisprudence, 92 KY. L.J. 483, 493 (2004). 
 9. Darlene Jespersen, for example, preferred to leave her job rather than wear makeup on a 
daily basis. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108. 
 10. See Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 11. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109. 
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disadvantage individuals who diverge from prescribed, gender-based 
stereotypes of appropriate appearance and affirm gendered distinctions that 
devalue women.12 Nonetheless, under Frank’s unequal burden test, if such dress 
codes are applied evenly to men and women, they are generally upheld. 
In recent years, courts have been increasingly willing to recognize that 
harassment of people who fail to conform to stereotypical gender roles 
constitutes proscribed discrimination based on sex.13 Mandating conformity to 
the gender paradigm through compulsory appearance codes similarly penalizes 
individuals who fail to conform to stereotypical norms and perpetuates the 
existence of traditional gender identity and behavioral norms that devalue 
women, feminized men, and sexual minorities. Using principles from sexual 
harassment law as a model for the development of dress code law, I argue that 
in some cases, even dress codes that equally burden men and women may 
constitute either gender identity or gender expression discrimination—or both—
and thereby violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.14 
In sexual harassment law, courts have grappled with the “equal 
opportunity harasser” problem.15 Formalistically following the letter of Title VII, 
which requires that discrimination be “because of sex” for a discrimination 
claim to be actionable, many courts over the years have held that if an employer 
harasses both men and women, the conduct does not rise to the level of sexual 
harassment because both sexes are treated equally.16 Such holdings are based on 
the idea that without comparative evidence showing differential treatment of 
men and women, harassing conduct that targets both sexes cannot be found to 
violate Title VII. Despite some courts’ continuing adherence to this rigid notion 
of discrimination that requires comparative evidence, many courts have rejected 
the equal opportunity harasser defense, allowing for the possibility of actionable 
sexual harassment of some women and some men in the same workplace by the 
same employer.17 
Since Title VII does not define “because of sex” and the Supreme Court has 
left open the possibility of various formulations, courts have been able to find 
ways around the causation hurdle presented in equal opportunity harasser 
cases, ranging from bypassing discussion of the “because of sex” requirement 
altogether to espousing a broader meaning of the term “sex.” The best-reasoned 
cases and commentary, noting the absurdity of a rule that provides an incentive 
for a defendant to harass members of both sexes in order to create a defense to 
 
 12. See infra Parts IV.A & IV.B. 
 13. See infra notes 75 and 78 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 82–87. 
 14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000). 
 15. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. Related to the equal opportunity harasser is 
the bisexual harasser. An equal opportunity harasser may or may not be bisexual but sexually 
harasses members of both sexes, whereas a bisexual harasser is, in fact, bisexual, but may not 
actually harass members of both sexes. See Sandra Levitsky, Footnote 55: Closing the “Bisexual Defense” 
Loophole in Title VII Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1013 (1996). Because of parallels with 
the dress code cases, this Article deals exclusively with the equal opportunity harasser. 
 16. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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sexual harassment,18 generally examine individual plaintiffs’ claims separately. 
This approach considers whether the conduct directed at an individual was 
based on that individual’s sex, gender, or failure to conform to gender 
stereotypes, without engaging in a direct comparison with the treatment of 
employees of the opposite sex. 
Applying the unequal burdens test to appearance codes presents a 
challenge similar to the equal opportunity harasser conundrum: even if applied 
relatively equally to men and women, sex-specific dress codes can be oppressive 
and discriminatory to members of both sexes. They perpetuate power 
paradigms harmful to both men and women and penalize individuals who 
deviate from social norms. Importing interpretations of Title VII developed from 
the equal opportunity harasser doctrine to dress code cases—which also fall 
under the purview of Title VII—would allow courts to focus on the sex-based 
underpinnings of employer dress codes that construct women as generally 
inferior to men and the harm that dress codes present to individuals who 
deviate from accepted gender norms, without requiring comparative evidence 
of unequal burdens to both sexes. 
Part II of this Article sets forth the state of the law dealing with employer-
mandated appearance and dress codes by examining both the types of plaintiffs 
who challenge dress codes and the nature of the typical challenges. It also 
analyzes the unequal burdens test employed by courts to resolve those cases. 
Part III examines the development of the law surrounding the equal opportunity 
harasser. This Part delves into the ambiguities inherent in the “because of sex” 
language of Title VII and the various ways in which courts have circumvented 
this hurdle when a supervisor harasses both men and women. 
Part IV suggests ways in which the same lines of analysis can be employed 
in cases involving mandatory appearance codes. Specifically, this Part exposes 
two flaws in the unequal burdens test and proposes two alternate approaches. 
Drawing from the equal opportunity harasser doctrine, the proposed 
approaches are better suited to the arena of dress codes and are more consistent 
with the substantial body of existing Title VII sex discrimination law. The first 
approach would use an individualized analysis that considers the harm each 
individual plaintiff experiences from sex-specific dress codes, without requiring 
comparative evidence. This approach would emphasize the intangible harm 
imposed on women by dress codes that have roots in negative stereotypes about 
a woman’s role in the workplace, as well as the harm to men that arises from the 
same negative stereotypes that construct an image of appropriate “masculine” 
 
 18. See, e.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
even if plaintiff used sexual epithets equal in intensity and in an equally degrading manner against 
male employees, he cannot thereby “cure” his conduct toward women); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating 
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (D. Wyo. 1993) (finding that the nature of a supervisor’s remarks—
made towards both men and women—indicated that he harassed the plaintiffs because of their 
gender and that such conduct constituted exactly the type of harassment contemplated to fall within 
the purview of Title VII); Levitsky, supra note 15, at 1045 (arguing that the increasing use of the 
“bisexual defense” to escape Title VII liability illustrates one of the fundamental inadequacies of the 
comparative standard in sexual harassment law); Mark J. McCullough, One Is a Claim, Two Is a 
Defense: Bringing an End to the Equal Opportunity Harasser Defense, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 469, 484–85 
(2005) (arguing for an individual mode of analysis in Title VII discrimination cases). 
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appearance that not all men meet. The second approach would conceive of “sex” 
in its broadest, most meaningful sense, encompassing not just biological sex but 
also gender, gender expression, and gender identity. Drawing from the growing 
body of law on gender identity and expression discrimination, this approach 
would extend the inquiry beyond comparing the burden imposed by sex-
specific dress codes on men and women as biological classes to comparing the 
burden imposed on men and women who fail to conform to community-
imposed norms related to sex and others. This Article ultimately concludes that 
if the well-reasoned law rejecting the equal opportunity harasser defense were 
applied to sex-specific dress codes, such appearance mandates would no longer 
be permitted. 
II. THE LAW SURROUNDING APPEARANCE AND DRESS CODES 
Dress and appearance issues usually fall under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to . . . terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”19 Gender-specific dress codes are clearly terms and conditions 
of employment within the meaning of Title VII.20 Even though they may amount 
to sex discrimination in violation of Title VII in some cases, they are more often 
accepted as a legitimate business decision, even when based on assumptions 
and expectations about gender differences.21 
Initially, courts held that reasonable dress and grooming requirements 
which regulated mutable characteristics of both sexes—such as clothing, hair, 
cosmetics and jewelry—did not violate Title VII. In contrast, appearance codes 
seeking to regulate immutable characteristics—such as sex, race or national 
origin—were generally not permissible.22 Under this regime, issues arose when 
appearance standards regulating mutable characteristics were gender-specific. 
Under the slightly broader unequal burdens test, such standards are generally 
upheld as long as they are comparable in terms of conventional societal custom 
and do not impose a greater burden on one sex over the other.23 For example, 
women can be sanctioned for wearing too much makeup where male employees 
are also required to dress conservatively.24 Additionally, grooming codes for 
 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
 20. Additionally, the National Labor Relations Board has held that appearance codes are “terms 
and conditions of employment” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., 
Crittenton Hosp., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (2004) (finding uniform and fingernail policies regulating the 
appearance of nurses to be mandatory subjects of bargaining). For a discussion of how labor law and 
collective bargaining can be used to protect employees from sex-specific appearance codes, see 
Michael J. Yelnosky, What Do Unions Do About Appearance Codes?, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 521 
(2007). 
 21. See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
 22. See generally William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth Circuit’s Unequal 
Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards Under Title VII, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
1357, 1359 (2006); Michael W. Fox, Piercings, Makeup, and Appearance: The Changing Face of 
Discrimination Law, 69 TEX. B. J. 564, 564 (2006); Farrell, supra note 8. 
 23. See Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 24. See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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men are more likely to be upheld than similar codes for women, most likely 
because they tend to be less demeaning than grooming codes for women.25 Thus, 
courts have permitted prohibitions of jewelry for men, but not women,26 and 
regulations regarding men’s hair length and facial hair, as long as these 
requirements were meant to protect the company’s business image.27 
There are, however, some distinct limitations. When a dress code is applied 
solely or more stringently to women, it is more likely to be struck down. Thus, 
employers cannot require only women to wear a uniform28 or contact lenses,29 
prohibit tattoos on women but not men,30 or have different weight requirements 
for men and women, if one is more burdensome to meet than the other.31 
Further, dress codes requiring women to wear “skimpy” or sexy uniforms have 
been held to constitute gender discrimination if that uniform is likely to invite 
sexual harassment.32 In EEOC v. Sage Realty, for example, female lobby 
attendants in an office building were required to wear a poncho with snaps at 
each wrist but otherwise open on the sides, and were prohibited from wearing a 
shirt, blouse, or skirt under the outfit.33 The court struck down the dress code, 
holding that requiring women to wear the uniform, which was “short and 
revealing on both sides [such that] her thighs and portions of her buttocks were 
 
 25. See generally Farrell, supra note 8, at 493 (explaining that “Congress’ intent was to afford 
equal employment opportunities for women relative to those available to men” and courts “cannot 
seem to conceive of any way in which protecting male employees with long hair could possibly 
effectuate that goal”). 
 26. See, e.g., Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit Union, No. 86 CV 1944, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14475, *2 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 1987) (upholding a rule prohibiting male, but not female, employees 
from wearing earrings), aff’d without opinion, 837 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987); Lockhart v. La.-Pac. Corp., 
795 P.2d 602 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding “a reasonable grooming policy” forbidding male 
employees from wearing “facial jewelry,” while permitting female employees to wear earrings). 
 27. See supra note 1. See generally EEOC Compl. Man. § 619.3 (BNA) (2002). 
 28. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(holding that requiring women to wear uniforms when men could wear “appropriate business 
attire” violated Title VII); O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 
266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that a policy requiring women to wear uniform smocks but allowing 
men to wear normal business dress demeaned women). 
 29. See, e.g., Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (striking down a rule 
requiring female flight attendants to wear contact lenses when male flight attendants could wear 
glasses), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
 30. See, e.g., Hub Folding Box Co. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrim., No. 99-P-1848, 2001 
WL789248 (Mass. App. Ct. July 12, 2001) (striking down a rule permitting men, but not women, to 
have conspicuous tattoos). 
 31. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (striking down a 
rule requiring female flight attendants to maintain a weight corresponding to women of “medium” 
build determined by an insurance company table, but permitting men to maintain the weight 
corresponding to men of “large” build); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that airline’s weight requirement on its face constituted discrimination under Title VII 
because the policy applied only to females and the airline did not assert any non-discriminatory 
justification for its practice); Laffey, 567 F.2d at 454 (striking down a policy imposing weight 
restrictions on female but not male flight attendants). 
 32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Newtown Inn Assocs., 647 F. Supp. 957, 958 (E.D. Va. 1986); Priest v. 
Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1986); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609–11 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 33. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. at 604. 
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exposed,”34 created a hostile working environment under Title VII sexual 
harassment law. 
Even facially discriminatory policies, however, will be upheld according to 
the language of Title VII if there is a bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ).35 To constitute a BFOQ, the discrimination must relate to the 
employee’s ability to do her job, not just the success of the business based on an 
actual or perceived customer preference.36 Accordingly, it is generally 
permissible for an employer to make an employment decision based on gender, 
religion, or national origin where “religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise.”37 The BFOQ defense is also generally available 
in age discrimination cases,38 though race can never constitute a BFOQ.39 
In April 2006, the Ninth Circuit upheld the unequal burdens test, finding 
that a gender-specific grooming code did not violate Title VII. In Jespersen v. 
Harrah’s Operating Co.,40 a female employee of Harrah’s Casino claimed that the 
employer’s “Personal Best” grooming code violated Title VII. Female bartenders 
at Harrah’s were required to wear makeup, stockings, and colored nail polish, 
and to wear their hair teased, curled, or styled, while male employees were 
prohibited from wearing makeup or colored nail polish and were required to 
maintain short haircuts and neatly trimmed fingernails.41 Jespersen found these 
requirements so inconsistent with her gender identity that she refused to 
comply with them. She advanced two arguments to support her refusal to wear 
the required makeup. First, she argued that the policy failed Frank’s unequal 
burdens test because the financial cost of purchasing makeup, together with the 
time it takes to apply it, imposed a heavier burden on women than any burden 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Title VII states, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his 
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). 
 36. See, e.g., Local 567 Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Mich. Council 25, 635 
F. Supp. 1010 (D. Mich. 1986) (holding that privacy rights of mental health patients could justify the 
requirement for same sex healthcare workers as a BFOQ); EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. 
Ill. 1993) (holding a women’s health club’s refusal to employ men in managerial positions did not 
violate Title VII because the positions allegedly involved substantial intimate contact with 
members); Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (D. Ill. 1984) (holding employer’s 
requirement that janitors be men was a BFOQ because janitors who cleaned the men’s bathrooms 
could see men using the facilities and workers were prevalent during daylight hours); Torres v. 
Wisc. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding maximum security 
women’s facility’s hiring of only female correctional officers was a BFOQ). See generally David B. 
Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 243–44 (2004) (criticizing 
courts that rely on BFOQ exception to Title VII to uphold sex-discriminatory dress and appearance 
requirements); Megan Kelly, Making-Up Conditions of Employment: The Unequal Burdens Test as a 
Flawed Mode of Analysis in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 45 (2006). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 38. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (West Supp. 2006). 
 39. See Morton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1260 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 40. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 41. Id. at 1107. 
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imposed on men.42 She also argued that the policy forced her to conform to sex 
stereotypes, in violation of Title VII, stating that it “made her feel sick, degraded, 
exposed, and violated,” and “‘forced her to be feminine’ and to become ‘dolled 
up’ like a sexual object.”43 She alleged that it “interfered with her ability to be an 
effective bartender . . . because it ‘took away [her] credibility as an individual 
and as a person.’”44 
The court held that Harrah’s rules were not more burdensome for women 
than for men, who had to maintain short haircuts and neatly trimmed nails,45 
and therefore did not violate the “unequal burdens” test articulated in Frank.46 
Further, the court held that the employer’s rules “d[id] not require Jespersen to 
conform to a stereotypical image that would objectively impede her ability to 
perform her job requirements as a bartender.”47 The en banc majority 
emphasized that “[t]his is not a case where the dress or appearance requirement 
is intended to be sexually provocative, and tending to stereotype women as sex 
objects.”48 Rather, Jespersen was simply required to wear a uniform covering her 
entire body designed for both male and female employees. Accordingly, the 
court found that the policy showed no “discriminatory or sexually stereotypical 
intent on the part of Harrah’s.”49 
Three dissenting judges argued for the inclusion of less tangible factors 
such as gender stereotyping in the unequal burdens test. In his dissent to the 
2004 appellate opinion, Judge Thomas suggested that Jespersen could prove her 
case under either an impermissible sex stereotypes theory or imposition of an 
unequal burden.50 He noted that being “properly made-up,” as required by the 
policy, was an additional burden to women. He also argued that the makeup 
requirement is based on a sex stereotype that sends “a message of gender 
subordination.”51 
In his dissent to the 2006 opinion, Judge Pregerson, joined by Judges 
Kozinski, Graber, and Fletcher, argued that Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy was 
motivated by sexual stereotyping. He noted that the makeup requirement was, 
in effect, a “facial uniform” imposed only on females.52 Judge Kozinski, joined by 
Judges Graber and Fletcher, agreed that the burden on women was greater than 
the burden on men.53 However, he rejected the need for expert or special 
evidence to show the time and money burden of the makeup policy, as most 
 
 42. Id. at 1110. 
 43. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 409 F.3d 
1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111. 
 46. Id. at 1109–11 (citing Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). 
 47. Id. at 1113. 
 48. Id. at 1112 (comparing the case to EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981)). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2004) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 51. Id. at 1086. 
 52. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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women have applied makeup and most men have waited while women apply 
it.54 Further, he pointed out that the choice of wearing makeup or losing one’s 
job was not a choice males in the same position were forced to make.55 
III. GRAPPLING WITH TITLE VII’S “BECAUSE OF SEX” CAUSATION REQUIREMENT: THE 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSER AS A MODEL FOR DRESS CODE LAW 
The unequal burdens test allows employers to institute a dress policy that 
is burdensome to women, as long as a corresponding policy is equally 
burdensome to men. As the Jespersen dissent pointed out, under this logic, “a 
sex-differentiated appearance requirement that burdens women . . . could be 
permissible if the employer unfairly burdened men via another sex-
differentiated appearance requirement.”56 Thus, despite the fact that all sex-
specific appearance codes are inherently based on harmful sex stereotypes, and 
unfairly discriminate against both men and women on the basis of gender 
identity and expression, such codes will be upheld as long as that unfair 
treatment of men and women is equivalent. 
A similar conundrum is seen in sexual harassment cases involving the 
“equal opportunity” harasser. These cases involve perpetrators who harass both 
men and women alike. A plaintiff who has been harassed in this way may be 
unable to prove the harassment was “because of sex,” as required for a Title VII 
cause of action,57 since both sexes endured equally bad treatment. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit first 
raised the anomalous issue of an “equal opportunity” or bisexual harasser in the 
now-famous footnote 55 of Barnes v. Costle, which states that “in the case of a 
bisexual superior, the insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute gender 
discrimination because it would apply to male and female employees alike.”58 
Subsequent courts struggled to handle the seemingly illogical consequence of 
strictly following the Title VII rule that harassment be “because of sex.” A string 
of cases found that harassing people of both sexes was a defense to a Title VII 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1118. 
 56. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1085. 
 57. For articles discussing the conundrum of the equal opportunity or bisexual harasser, see 
generally Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of “Sex”: Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment Under Title 
VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55 (1995); Katherine Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 691 (1997); Martin J. Katz, Reconsidering Attraction in Sexual Harassment, 79 IND. L.J. 101 (2004); 
Levitsky, supra note 15; Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recognizing 
Sexual Harassment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 383 (1996); Dawn Macready, 
Statutory Construction as a Means of Judicial Restraint on Government: A Case Study in Bisexual 
Harassment Under Title VII, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 659 (2001); McCullough, supra note 18; Ronald 
Turner, Title VII and the Inequality-Enhancing Effects of the Bisexual and Equal Opportunity Harasser 
Defenses, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 341 (2005). 
 58. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The issue of the bisexual harasser 
remained hypothetical for nearly twenty years, until it was first taken up in Ryczek v. Guest Servs., 
Inc., 877 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1995). In that case, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia declined to rule specifically on whether a person who harasses both sexes is immune from 
Title VII liability, but noted that the language of footnote fifty-five in Barnes presents an interesting 
Title VII problem in that it requires the court to develop standards for proof of bisexuality. Id. at 761 
n.6. 
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sexual harassment claim, as conduct cannot be “because of sex” where men and 
women are treated equally.59 In 1998, the Supreme Court gave subtle support for 
that line of cases in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services., Inc., a case allowing a 
cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment.60 In that case, the Court heavily 
emphasized the importance of comparative evidence showing one sex was 
treated differently from the other, though it never went as far as saying such 
evidence was required.61 Nonetheless, although the circuit courts are still 
divided on the scope and meaning of the “because of sex” standard, a growing 
body of authority now rejects the equal opportunity harasser defense and 
recognizes that harassing conduct directed at both men and women that is 
sufficiently severe and pervasive does amount to sexual harassment.62 
 
 59. See, e.g., Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding no actionable 
harassment claim where a male supervisor was equally abusive to both men and women); Holman 
v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that equal opportunity harassment of 
employees of both sexes cannot support Title VII sex discrimination claim, as conduct is not 
“because of sex”); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating, in dicta, that 
equal opportunity harassment does not amount to gender discrimination under Title VII); Henson v. 
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904–05 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that in “cases in which a supervisor 
makes sexual overtures to workers of both sexes or where the conduct complained of is equally 
offensive to male and female workers . . . the sexual harassment would not be based upon sex 
because men and women alike are accorded like treatment . . . [and] the plaintiff would have no 
remedy under Title VII”); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that only in 
the rare case of a bisexual supervisor who harasses both men and women could sexual harassment 
not amount to sex discrimination); Venezia v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., Inc., No. 03C7225, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 4281, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2004) (holding that “[a]n ‘equal opportunity harasser’ is not 
covered by Title VII”), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 421 F.3d 468 (7th Cir. 2005); Cabaniss v. 
Coosa Valley Med. Ctr., No. CV 93-PT-2710-E, 1995 WL 241937, at *26 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 1995) 
(recognizing that when the “‘conduct complained of is equally offensive to male and female 
workers, . . . the sexual harassment would not be based on sex because men and women are 
accorded like treatment’” (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982))); 
Raney v. Dist. of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that a bisexual supervisor 
who sexually harasses only one sex is liable for sex discrimination under Title VII, but that there is 
no sex discrimination where a supervisor harasses both sexes equally). 
 60. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 61. Id. at 80–81 (stating that a plaintiff can prove that harassment was caused by sex by 
“offer[ing] direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both 
sexes in a mixed-sex workplace”). 
 62. See, e.g., Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that “[i]t is axiomatic 
that mistreatment at work, whether through subjection to a hostile environment or through such 
concrete deprivations as being fired or being denied a promotion, is actionable under Title VII only 
when it occurs because of an employee’s sex, or other protected characteristic”); Smith v. First Union 
Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 238–39, 242 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument that a female plaintiff, 
who was subjected “to a barrage of threats and gender-based insults” by her supervisor, could not 
have been harassed on account of her sex because both men and women complained about the 
alleged perpetrator); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting “[i]t would be 
exceedingly perverse if a male worker could buy his supervisors and his company immunity from 
Title VII liability by taking care to harass sexually an occasional male worker, though his preferred 
targets were female”); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463–64 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(finding that a hostile or offensive work environment is based on sex when the supervisor’s abuse is 
directed at both sexes, but the gender-specific abuse is limited to females); Labonia v. Doran Assocs., 
LLC, No. 3:01CV2399, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17025, at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 25, 2004) (maintaining that 
“‘[t]he inquiry into whether ill treatment was actually sex-based discrimination cannot be short-
circuited by the mere fact that both men and women are involved’” (quoting Brown, 257 F.3d at 
254)); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336–37 (D. Wyo. 1993) (rejecting a bar 
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A. The Causation Problem Generally 
Of all the elements of a sexual harassment claim, arguably the most 
conceptually difficult—and the one eliciting the greatest attention from both 
courts and scholars—is the requirement that the harassment be “because of 
sex.”63 It is this causation requirement that enables the equal opportunity 
harasser. The problem is two-fold: (1) Congress inadequately defined “because 
of” which is susceptible to a variety of meanings, and (2) although “sex” usually 
means “biological sex,” the word is often used interchangeably with “gender,” 
creating an additional ambiguity in the standard. 
1. When is Harassment “Because of” Sex? 
The question of the underlying cause of harassment has led to great 
confusion and disagreement among both courts and commentators. Title VII 
does not specify whether harassment must be intentional to be “because of sex,” 
and courts have been left to grapple with “how much” of the employment 
decision has to be shown to be sex-based to meet the standard.64 In addition, it is 
unclear from the statutory language whether males and females must be treated 
differently, or whether it is sufficient to show that sexualized conduct was 
invidious.65 Indeed, Professor Martin Katz observed that “in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, the Supreme Court used over twenty different formulations to describe 
Title VII’s causation requirement,” including “‘a discernable factor,’” “‘a 
significant factor,’” “‘a motivating part,’” “‘a part,’” “a ‘substantial’ factor,” and 
“a ‘but-for’ cause,” among others.66 Each of these formulations, in turn, was left 
undefined, leaving room for wide-ranging interpretations. In 1991, Congress 
narrowed the test to the “motivating factor” standard and the “same action” 
standard, but again, failed to adequately define these terms.67 At the same time, 
courts interpreting different statutes have deviated from those tests, using other 
vaguely defined terms,68 “generating a thicket of vague, undefined, and often-
conflicting verbal formulations for causation.”69 
Most relevant to the equal opportunity harasser problem is whether 
comparative evidence and a showing of differential treatment are essential for a 
 
against Title VII liability for equal opportunity harassers and finding disparate treatment based on 
sex when committed by a male supervisor against employees of both sexes). 
 63. There has been a flurry of recent law review articles dealing with the causation requirement. 
See, e.g., Camille Hebert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 341 (2005); Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in 
Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489 (2006); Robert A. Kearney, The Disparate Impact Hostile 
Environment Claim: Sexual Harassment Scholarship at a Crossroads, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 185 
(2003); Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, “Because of . . . Sex”: Rethinking the Protections Afforded Under Title 
VII in the Post-Oncale World, 69 ALB. L. REV. 139 (2005); David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? 
The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (2002); Franke, supra note 57. 
 64. See generally Schwartz, supra note 63, at 1709–10. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Katz, supra note 63, at 491 n.5. 
 67. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075, codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991). See generally Katz, supra note 63, at 492. 
 68. See Katz, supra note 63, at 492–93. 
 69. See id. at 550. 
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finding of discrimination. In Oncale, the Supreme Court proposed two 
“evidentiary routes” that would support an inference that conduct in a sexual 
harassment case involving two parties of the same sex occurred because of sex. 
First, the Court stated that a trier of fact might reasonably infer the requisite sex-
based causal nexus “if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and 
derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is 
motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.”70 
Second, the Court suggested a same-sex plaintiff could “offer direct comparative 
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a 
mixed-sex workplace.”71 The Court thus conceived of conduct based on sex as 
conduct that affects males in one manner and females in another, giving rise to a 
direct comparison across the biologically-defined divide. 
The Court’s dicta offering examples of sex-based conduct do not, however, 
purport to require the forms of evidence discussed therein, or to preclude 
plaintiffs from raising an inference of sex-based causation by other means. Indeed, 
if under Oncale it is possible to find sexual harassment against a male in an all-
male work environment, then certainly it is possible to find sexual harassment 
without comparative evidence showing how the opposite sex was treated, since, 
of course, such evidence would not exist in an all-male workplace. Though in 
the post-Oncale judicial landscape direct comparative evidence of how the 
harasser treated members of the opposite sex may be more likely to overcome an 
equal opportunity harasser defense,72 no court has required such a showing.73 
2. The Ambiguity of “Sex” 
The ambiguity inherent in the word “sex” has also been the subject of rich 
debate.74 Courts have interpreted the word “sex” as narrowly as just biological 
sex,75 and as broadly as gender,76 gender stereotypes and identity,77 sexual 
imagery or epithets,78 and sexual behavior.79 
 
 70. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
 71. Id. at 80–81. 
 72. See, e.g., Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
plaintiff did not satisfy the “direct comparative evidence” evidentiary route articulated in Oncale 
because his evidence proved only that the alleged harasser treated the plaintiff differently from 
everyone else; he did not show that the harasser treated one gender differently than the other); Lack, 
240 F.3d at 261 (reversing jury award on the basis of plaintiff’s failure to produce “plausible 
evidence” that harassment was precipitated by defendant’s “hostility to Lack as a man”). 
 73. Schwartz, supra note 63, at 1713. 
 74. For a thorough and insightful discussion of the various possible interpretations of “because 
of sex,” see generally Marvin Dunson III, Sex, Gender, and Transgender: The Present and Future of 
Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 465, 495 (2001) (surveying the various 
scholarly interpretations of “because of sex”); Schwartz, supra note 63, at 1709–14. 
 75. See, e.g., Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 701 (7th Cir. 
2000) (holding “Congress intended the term ‘sex’ to mean ‘biological male or biological female,’ and 
not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation”). 
 76. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) (using “because of . . . sex” and 
“because of . . . gender” interchangeably); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 (holding that Congress 
intended to “forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions”). See 
generally Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex 
from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995) (advocating an interpretation of “because of sex” that 
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The term “sex” embodies many interrelated factors, including 
chromosomes, genitalia, secondary sex characteristics, gender traits, and 
sexuality. Traditionally, each of these concepts was thought to embody duality: 
All people were thought to be either male or female (duality in chromosomes, 
genitalia, and secondary sex characteristics), masculine or feminine (duality in 
gender traits), and sexually attracted to only males or only females (duality in 
sexuality). A person’s biological chromosomes and genitalia were used to 
determine all other factors. That is, a person with male genitalia was expected to 
act in a masculine fashion and to be sexually attracted to females, and vice versa. 
When all five factors converge in one person, the courts need not consider all the 
ideas embodied in the term “sex.” But it is now abundantly clear that there is a 
 
includes gender, explaining, “sex bears an epiphenomenal relationship to gender; that is, under close 
examination, almost every claim with regard to sexual identity or sex discrimination can be shown 
to be grounded in normative gender rules and roles”). 
 77. See, e.g., Hellebusch v. City of Wentzville, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20828, at *3, *5–*6 (E.D. Mo. 
Nov. 21, 1996) (recognizing that female employee in police department who was consistently subjected 
to taunts that she should be “at home baking cookies and taking care of her children” was harassed 
because of her sex); Zorn v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (recognizing that 
management-level female plaintiff who was consistently asked to perform stereotypically female tasks 
such as cleaning up after meetings and cleaning supply closets was harassed because of her sex); Morris 
v. Nat’l Can Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1489, 1491 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (recognizing that a female plaintiff who was 
told she “might as well sit underneath his desk since that’s where everybody says [she does] her best 
work” was harassed because of her sex); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (finding actionable sexual harassment under Title VII where a male waiter was 
systematically abused for failing to act “as a man should act” and for walking and carrying his tray 
“like a woman”); Zorn, 903 F. Supp. at 1237, 1244 (recognizing that repeated comments urging 
plaintiff to act more feminine amounted to harassment because of her sex); Danna v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 
752 F. Supp. 594, 598, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (upholding female service technician’s sexual harassment 
claim based on repeated suggestions that she act more feminine and cutesy); Sanchez v. City of 
Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974, 978, 982 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (upholding a jury verdict in favor of female 
police officer involved in bodybuilding who was harassed by male co-workers for failing to conform 
to notions of appropriate femininity); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc) (finding actionable sexual harassment under Title VII where a male hotel butler was the 
victim of assaults “of a sexual nature” by his male co-workers because they perceived him as 
effeminate); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566–67 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that same-sex sexual 
harassment was actionable under Title VII, regardless of the sexual orientation of the harasser, where two 
brothers were verbally and physically harassed by heterosexual male co-workers because they were 
perceived as effeminate), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998). 
 78. See, e.g., Hellebusch v. City of Wentzville, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20828 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 
1996) (recognizing the sex-based nature and gender-specific connotations of epithets such as 
“fucking bitch,” “fucking whore,” “slut,” and “fucking cunt”); Perry-Baker v. Runyon, 1996 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 15548 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1996) (finding the same, vis-à-vis epithets such as “walking 
pussy,” “cunt,” “bitch,” “whore,” and “slut”); Needy v. Village of Woodridge, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11813 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1997) (determining the same, vis-à-vis epithets such as “cunt,” “broad,” and 
“bitch”). 
 79. See, e.g., Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., 40 F.3d 230, 233, 237 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing 
that defendant’s conduct, which included slapping plaintiff’s buttocks, forcefully placing his foot in 
her crotch and wiggling it, and pulling on the waist of her pants to reveal her undergarments, was 
“because of sex”); Saum v. Widnall, 912 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Colo. 1996) (recognizing that defendant’s 
conduct, which included casting the plaintiff as the “victim” in a simulated rape and exploitation 
scenario, was “because of sex”); Pease v. Alford Photo Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1188, 1201–02 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1987) (recognizing that defendant’s conduct, which included a supervisor regularly touching 
and fondling his female employees on the shoulders, arms, necks, breasts and thighs, was “because 
of sex”). 
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spectrum of sexes and gender roles that and a person’s sexual identity is not 
always based on his or her biological organs.80 
Under the umbrella of Title VII’s “because of sex” language, many federal 
and state courts have recognized the complexity of the term “sex” and found it 
illegal to discriminate against employees not just based on their biological sex, 
but also based on their gender identity or gender expression.81 The phrase 
“gender identity” refers to one’s self-identification as a man or a woman, 
regardless of one’s anatomical sex at birth.82 Usually, one’s gender identity 
matches one’s anatomical sex; that is, people born with the physical 
characteristics of males usually identify as men and those with the physical 
characteristics of females usually identify as women. However, for some people, 
gender identity does not always align with anatomical sex. Thus, for transsexual 
people, gender identity and anatomical sex are not in agreement. Someone born 
male may have a strong self-image and self-identification as a woman; someone 
born female may have a strong internal self-image and self-identification as a 
man.83 
The phrase “gender expression” refers to how society views and interprets 
one’s gender identity based on the person’s manifestations through clothing, 
behavior, and grooming. Someone’s gender identity may be the same as his or 
her biological sex, but that person may still be perceived differently by others. 
For example, someone may be born male and self-identify as a man, but may be 
nonetheless perceived by others as feminine.84 
The Supreme Court has recognized that discrimination in the workplace 
based on gender stereotypes meets the “because of sex” requirement of Title VII. 
In the landmark case Price Waterhouse,85 the Court recognized a cause of action 
for sex discrimination where the plaintiff was adversely affected by conduct that 
penalized her for failing to conform to stereotypically female norms. In that case, 
the plaintiff was denied partnership because her male partners perceived her as 
too aggressive and “macho.” She was told to “walk more femininely, talk more 
 
 80. It is now commonly accepted that there is no intrinsic or stable sexual or gender identity. See 
generally Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination: The Disaggregation of Sex From 
Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLES 25 (1990) (“There is no 
gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the 
very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”). 
 81. Over twenty states have so ruled. See Gender Public Advocacy Coalition, States with 
Gender Expression, Identity Protections Surpass Those with Sexual Orientation for First Time (July 
1, 2004), http://www.gpac.org/archive/news/notitle.html?cmd=view&archive=news&msgnum 
=0555 (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). With the 2004 ruling by the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem, 
378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a transsexual had a Title VII discrimination case when 
he was criticized for failing to conform to sex stereotypes), twenty-one states now have protections 
in place that ban workplace discrimination based on an individual’s gender expression or identity. 
See id. 
 82. WorkplaceFairness.org, Gender Identity Discrimination, http://www.workplacefairness. 
org/index.php?page=genderid&view=print&theme=6 (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.; see, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566–67 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 523 
U.S. 1001 (1998) (involving heterosexual sixteen-year-old whose sexuality was questioned because he 
wore an earring); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (involving a male whose sexuality 
was questioned because he did not have a wife or girlfriend). 
 85. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up [sic], have her hair styled, and 
wear jewelry.”86 The Court rejected the assertion that these assessments of the 
plaintiff were not based on her sex and held that she had a cause of action under 
Title VII. 
The Price Waterhouse Court recognized that the term “sex,” for purposes of 
Title VII, extends beyond the notion of biological sex to encompass gender roles 
and stereotypes that are imposed upon individuals as a result of their biological 
sex. The Court therefore proscribed adverse conduct that is based on a person’s 
failure to conform to stereotypical notions of gender-appropriate appearance 
and demeanor.87 
Many lower courts have also found that harassment directed at a person 
based on his or her failure to conform to gender stereotypes constitutes 
harassment based on sex. For example, courts have found the “because of sex” 
requirement to be satisfied where a female police officer who was involved in 
bodybuilding and used steroids was harassed for failing to adhere to gender-
based stereotypes of appropriate female appearance and conduct;88 and where a 
female repair service technician was told that she would have gotten more 
assistance if she were more “feminine and cutesy.”89 These courts recognized, 
implicitly or explicitly, that the plaintiff’s sex consists of a constellation of factors 
including not only her biological attributes but also her conformity to gender-
based stereotypes and her projected or perceived sexuality. 
In each of these cases, the harassment was not directed toward all women 
based on their biological status as women, but rather it was aimed at particular 
women who diverged from gender-based norms. Nonetheless, the courts readily 
concluded that this conduct was based on the targets’ sex because the traits 
elicited the harassers’ hostilities only when exhibited by women. Accordingly, it is 
 
 86. Id. at 235. 
 87. After the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse expanded the coverage of Title VII to include 
sex stereotypes, many courts concluded that the expansion should apply to transgendered people. 
See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that “sex stereotyping 
based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective 
of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim 
where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”); 
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding a claim brought by a 
transgendered man, noting that the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse interpreted “sex” as 
encompassing both anatomical sex and gender); Sturchio v. Ridge, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27345, *4–5 
(D. Wash. Dec. 20, 2004) (holding that an employee who was subjected to harassment after her 
sexual reassignment surgery asserted a cognizable claim under Title VII); Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., 
164 Misc. 2d 547, 556 (N.Y. Misc. 1995) (holding in an action by an employee against his employer 
for public humiliation after the employee’s reassignment surgery that: “[A]n employer who harasses 
an employee because the person, as a result of surgery and hormone treatments, is now of a different 
sex has violated our City prohibition against discrimination based on sex.”). However, while the law 
is relatively undecided, many courts continue to adhere to a more rigid notion of “sex” in this 
context, refusing to support claims by transgendered and transsexual plaintiffs. See, e.g., Spearman v. 
Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Ulane v. Eastern Airlines 742 F.2d 1081, 
1085 (1984) (holding that “Congress intended the term ‘sex’ to mean ‘biological male or female’ and 
not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation”)). See generally Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17417, *27 n.59 (D. La. Sept. 16, 2002). 
 88. Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
 89. Danna v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 752 F. Supp. 594, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also, e.g., supra note 77. 
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apparent that cases analyzing sexual harassment have not adhered to a rigid, 
simplistic conception of “sex” in assessing whether the conduct could be 
characterized as conduct that occurred “because of” the plaintiff’s “sex” within the 
meaning of Title VII. The courts have recognized that harassment based on 
stereotypes of gender plays an integral role in perpetuating patterns of male 
domination and female subordination that characterize workplace gender 
hierarchies. Consequently, they have developed an understanding of sex-based 
discrimination that recognizes the interrelationships between gender stereotypes, 
sexual interactions, and sex discrimination in the employment market. 
B. Judicial Reinvention of “Because of Sex” for the Equal Opportunity Harasser 
As a result of Congress’ failure to clearly define “because of sex” in Title 
VII and the wide array of judicial formulations of the causation standard, courts 
resistant to the equal opportunity harasser defense have been able to find ways 
around the “because of sex” hurdle. Meanwhile, scholars have proposed 
additional approaches to this problem. 
Some commentators have advocated abandoning the causation 
requirement entirely,90 and some courts have gotten around the problem by 
simply directing attention away from the “because of sex” language. In 
McDonnell v. Cisneros, for example, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the 
“perverse” result that would ensue “if a male worker could buy his supervisor 
and his company immunity from Title VII liability by taking care to harass 
sexually an occasional male worker, though his preferred targets were female.”91 
Rather than dissect the meaning of “because of sex” with a detailed critique of 
previous cases subscribing to the equal opportunity harasser defense, the 
McDonnell court simply relied on logic and reason, proclaiming that courts that 
subscribe to the equal opportunity harasser defense “interpret sex 
discrimination in too literal a fashion.”92 Similarly, the court in Doe v. Belleville, 
commenting on a hypothetical bisexual harasser in dictum, suggested that 
courts espousing the equal opportunity harasser defense have wrongly taken 
the emphasis off the “factors we have regularly relied on [including] the content 
(physical and verbal) of the harassment, its gravity, its effect on the plaintiff, and 
its effect on the reasonable person.”93 In doing so, the court deflected attention 
away from the causation requirement altogether and onto considerations it 
found to be more critical to the outcome. These courts presumably took their 
 
 90. See, e.g., Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives 
Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 65–67 (1991) (noting that Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence suggested that the Price Waterhouse majority dispensed entirely with any 
causation requirement); Kearney, supra note 63, at 216. 
 91. McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating 
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (D. Wyo. 1993) (noting that “[a]n odd and inefficient result would 
obtain” if the husband and wife’s lawsuit involving a dual complaint of harassment, were dismissed, 
since each could then pursue individual actions). 
 92. McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 260. 
 93. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 590 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 523 U.S. 1001 
(1998). 
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lead from Supreme Court cases that use “because of sex” in the analysis but do 
not elucidate the causal requirement implicit in Title VII.94 
Professor Schwartz advances another approach. He advocates a revival of 
the “sex per se” rule under which sexual conduct in the workplace is always 
“because of sex,” without regard to the discriminatory intent of the harasser. 
Such a rule, he argues, would “eliminate the ‘bisexual harasser’ problem for 
claims involving sexual conduct since all sexual conduct is ‘because of sex’ 
regardless of whether it is directed at just women, or equally at women and 
men.”95 
Others have suggested adopting an individualized analysis. This approach 
would examine each plaintiff’s claim separately without regard to other claims 
against the same defendant and without requiring comparative evidence 
showing that the other sex was treated differently. As noted in Brown v. 
Henderson, “[i]n determining whether an employee has been discriminated 
against ‘because of such individual’s . . . sex,’ the courts have consistently 
emphasized that the ultimate issue is the reason for the individual plaintiff’s 
treatment, not the relative treatment of different groups within the workplace.”96 
Looking at the claims individually would allow courts to consider whether 
the harassment of one sex was quantitatively or qualitatively different from the 
harassment of the other sex.97 That is, a supervisor may harass both men and 
women employees, but to different degrees; or, a supervisor may harass both 
men and women, but in different ways. Where that occurs, the conduct directed 
at each plaintiff—if sufficiently severe and pervasive—would amount to sexual 
harassment. But looking at the claims individually would also allow courts to 
recognize claims by some women and some men in the same workplace, even 
without such comparative evidence. 
This approach was adopted in Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., which 
involved male and female plaintiffs each alleging sexual harassment by the 
same male supervisor. In that case, a male supervisor harassed female 
employees by subjecting them to sexually abusive remarks and making sexual 
advances toward them. He also harassed male employees by bragging about his 
sexual prowess and graphically describing sexual acts he wanted to perform on 
female employees and on the wives of some male employees.98 The court 
“compartmentalized the claims into gender groups,”99 looking at the plaintiffs’ 
claims separately and focusing on the conduct targeted at each individual 
without considering conduct directed at other individuals.100 The court noted, “it 
is not unthinkable to argue that each individual who is harassed is being treated 
 
 94. See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
 95. Schwartz, supra note 63, at 1793. 
 96. Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.2d 246, 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “there is no per se bar 
to maintaining a claim of sex discrimination where a person of another sex has been similarly 
treated”). 
 97. See Calleros, supra note 57, at 73. 
 98. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1335 (D. Wyo. 1993). 
 99. Macready, supra note 57, at 673. 
 100. See Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337. See generally McCullough, supra note 18, at 482–85. 
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badly because of gender,”101 and suggested that the remarks made to both male 
and female plaintiffs were “gender-driven.”102 
While the treatment may have been relatively equal in severity toward 
male and female plaintiffs in Chiapuzio, the reason each plaintiff was targeted 
was quite clearly “because of sex.” As for the conduct complained of by the 
female plaintiffs, it could certainly be viewed as sex-based since the supervisor 
was a heterosexual male who did not make similar remarks and advances to any 
male employees. Male employees, however, were harassed in another way. 
Although the defendant’s remarks were primarily aimed at the female plaintiffs, 
the court found they were also intended to demean their husbands, as the 
remarks were often made in earshot of the husbands and typically involved 
reference to the fact that he could “do a better job of making love to [the wives] 
than the [husbands] could.”103 
Finally, many commentators addressing the issue of the equal opportunity 
harasser have advocated a broad interpretation of “sex,” consistent with Price 
Waterhouse and its progeny, to include not just biological sex, but also gender, 
sexual conduct, core sexual or gender identity, gender role identity, and sexual 
or gender expression.104 Construing the notion of “sex” under Title VII in this 
more complex, multifaceted way would open the door to a finding of actionable 
sex-based harassment of a female employee based on a failure to conform to 
stereotypical notions of femininity and of a male employee in the same 
workplace based on a failure to conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity. 
IV. RETHINKING CAUSATION IN DRESS CODE LITIGATION: APPLYING EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY HARASSER DOCTRINE TO JESPERSEN AND ITS PROGENY 
Each of the approaches to “because of sex” discussed above105 could be 
easily imported to the appearance discrimination cases. Courts could simply 
choose to shift their attention away from comparing the burdens imposed by 
sex-specific dress codes on each sex and redirect it to more important factors 
such as the harm imposed on plaintiffs from the dress requirements. Application 
of the unequal burdens test, which would uphold a sex-specific dress code 
based on gender-based stereotypes burdensome to both men and women, is no 
less “perverse” than the application of the equal opportunity harasser defense. 
But this approach would be subject to the same criticism it receives in the equal 
opportunity harasser context for ignoring Title VII’s clear causation mandate. 
Dress code jurisprudence could also adapt the “sex per se” rule, as 
advocated by Professor Schwartz, under which sexualized conduct directed at 
both men and women would automatically be considered sexual harassment, 
 
 101. Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337 (quoting John J. Donahue, Review Essay: Advocacy Versus 
Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1610–11 (1992)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1335. 
 104. See, e.g., Calleros, supra note 57, at 56; Franke, supra note 57, at 772; Kearny, supra note 63, at 
212; Kirshenbaum, supra note 63, at 156; Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections 
on the Development of Sexual Harassment Law, GEO. L. J. 813, 829 (2002); McCullough, supra note 18, at 
471. 
 105. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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despite the fact that it is directed evenly at men and women. Under parallel 
reasoning, sex-specific dress code policies that require employees to wear 
sexualized or provocative uniforms would be inherently based on sex, and 
accordingly would be a per se violation of Title VII. But while the sex per se rule 
would neatly address sexually exploitive dress requirements,106 where for the 
most part courts have already recognized the harm, it would fail to address 
other concrete harms experienced by women and men from dress requirements 
that are not provocative or sexy, but that force conformity to destructive gender 
norms. 
This Part focuses on two other means by which courts have dealt with the 
causation problem when men and women are both subjected to harassing 
conduct. This section advocates an individualized analysis that would look at 
the effect of dress codes on individual women and individual men who fail to 
comport with gender-based stereotypes about how men and women should 
look and act. Sex-specific dress codes perpetuate gendered paradigms that 
empower some men and subordinate women and feminized men, and are 
therefore imposed “because of sex” in violation of Title VII. This Part also 
advocates a broadened definition of “sex” whereby dress codes would give rise 
to a Title VII claim if they discriminate against men or women based on gender 
identity or expression. 
A. Individualized Analysis: Harm to Both Men and Women from Forced 
Adherence to a Gender Paradigm that Legitimizes Social Norms that 
Devalue Women 
Sex-specific dress codes may impose relatively equal burdens on men and 
women but may restrict the autonomy of both men and women based on gender 
distinctions, giving rise to claims by those females and males who do not 
conform to the gender-based restriction. Because of the intangible harms to both 
men and women from forced adherence to destructive gender stereotypes, each 
claim would be “because of sex.” 
The unequal burdens test implies that a dress code as a whole can treat 
men and women equally, while applying “different, but somehow 
equivalent . . . restrictions to their freedom to choose their clothing, makeup, 
jewelry and hairstyles.”107 But dress requirements for women under a sex-
specific policy cannot be lumped together and then compared in general to the 
dress requirements for men.108 “For the man who wants to wear a pony-tail or a 
skirt, it is no consolation that women are prohibited from wearing short hair or 
 
 106. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally Karl E. 
Klare, Power Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1417 (1992) 
(stating “it is now illegal to require a woman to wear a sexually revealing outfit that has or likely 
will result in unwelcome verbal or physical harassment”). 
 107. Robert Wintemute, Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination: Transsexualism, Sexual 
Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD. L. REV. 334, 355 (1997). 
 108. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (Pregerson, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the makeup requirement should be viewed in isolation from the hair and 
hands policies). 
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trousers.”109 A grooming code requiring men to wear their hair short and women 
to wear skirts, in effect, discriminates against the female employee who 
genuinely wishes to wear pants and the male employee who wants to wear long 
hair. A woman under that policy is denied an opportunity she would have if she 
were a man, based only upon stereotypes of acceptable male and female 
behavior, and a man is denied an opportunity he would have if he were a 
woman, again based only on stereotypical norms, thus amounting to 
discrimination against some men and some women.110 
1. Harm to Women 
Most courts that have had the opportunity to apply the unequal burdens 
test have been unwilling to consider the harmful effects of sex stereotyping 
inherent in sex-specific dress codes as one of the burdens faced by plaintiffs. 
Though for the most part, courts have recognized the harm to women of 
imposing sexually exploitive dress requirements,111 where dress requirements 
are not provocative or sexy, courts have uniformly ignored the concrete harms 
experienced by women who are forced to conform to externally imposed gender 
norms that “construct, exploit, and devalue feminine attributes.”112 
In Jespersen, for example, the majority considered only the tangible harms of 
a dress policy that required men to maintain short haircuts and neatly trimmed 
fingernails and women to wear makeup and nail polish and keep their hair 
styled. Since the cost of makeup and nail polish were considered nominal, and 
the time required to comply with each policy was roughly equivalent, the court 
found the burden on females to be no greater than the burden on males.113 The 
court failed, however, to consider the fact that the makeup, hair, and dress 
requirements are deeply rooted in traditional notions of how men and women 
should look and are based on stereotypes that deride feminine traits and 
marginalize individuals who possess such traits. 
Courts typically permit gender-specific dress codes that are consistent with 
community norms.114 In this way, “courts may excuse dress and appearance 
requirements they deem trivial in their impact on employees, or neutral in 
affecting men and women alike, or essential to the employer’s lawful business 
 
 109. Wintemute, supra note 107, at 355. 
 110. Id.; see also Klare, supra note 106, at 1420 (noting “the law empowers employers to insist that 
employees conform to socially constructed norms and expectations about how the sexes should act 
and look. Employers may punish people who challenge or deviate from prevailing norms”). 
 111. See Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). See generally Klare, supra note 106, at 
1417 (stating “it is now illegal to require a woman to wear a sexually revealing outfit that has or 
likely will result in unwelcome verbal or physical harassment”). 
 112. Thomas Ling, Smith v. City of Salem: Title VII Protects Contra-Gender Behavior, 40 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 277, 282 (2005). Several commentators have emphasized the fact that the Jespersen court 
failed to acknowledge the intangible effects of the makeup policy, leaving women feeling like 
“ornamental objects of beauty to be contemplated, [and] not agents with talents to be esteemed.” 
Cruz, supra note 36, at 248; see also Hillary Bouchard, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.: Employer 
Appearance Standards and the Promotion of Gender Stereotypes, 58 ME. L. REV. 203, 218 (2006). 
 113. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110. 
 114. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2557; Bouchard, supra note 112, at 220–21. 
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objectives.”115 Community norms, however, are often based on harmful 
stereotypes that privilege existing power structures favoring men. 
Sex-specific dress and appearance codes generally perpetuate gendered 
paradigms that subordinate women. The demands on women from sex-specific 
dress requirements are notoriously “much more complex than men’s, involving 
more frequent changes in fashion, more time and effort to assemble, and a 
greater premium placed on having different clothes for different occasions and 
on not being seen in the same outfits too frequently.”116 Substantively, women’s 
standards tend to “objectify women and construct them as inferior, submissive, 
and less competent than men.”117 Furthermore, the clothing women are expected 
to wear has, throughout European history, “conveyed the message that its 
wearers are fragile, helpless, debilitated, armored, hobbled, decorative, non-
threatening, useless, and immobile.”118 
The classic example of a seemingly innocuous but actually harmful dress 
code is one that requires men to wear suits and ties and women to wear skirts. 
Though the tangible burdens of such a policy—including the costs and time 
required to purchase and wear such clothing—may be roughly equivalent for 
both sexes, the intangible burdens on women far outweigh those on men. While 
a requirement that male employees wear a business suit generally has the 
legitimate purpose to “convey confidence and command respect,” the 
underlying basis for the concomitant requirement that female employees wear a 
skirt are stereotypes that imply “women should be relegated to a more passive 
role in business or, worse, that women should have a certain sexual appeal.”119 
The requirement of a skirt, which makes women seem “less professional and 
more ornamental or vulnerable than those who wear pants,”120 emerged from 
women’s “historically inferior status,”121 while pants, which generally symbolize 
 
 115. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2544. 
 116. Id. at 2547. 
 117. Id.; see also Klare, supra note 106, at 1419. Klare observes, “employer bans on women wearing 
pants to work are based almost entirely on sex stereotypes: that women are less capable than men, 
that they are better suited for less active or assertive roles, that women must do more than men to 
appear serious and business-like, that a woman in pants at work is sexually provocative and 
therefore disruptive, that women’s clothing (skirts) should enhance their allure as sex objects, and so 
on.” Id. 
 118. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2547. Women walk a fine line when it comes to dress in the 
workplace, and are often “caught in what the Supreme Court has described as the ‘catch-22’ of sex 
discrimination based on gender stereotypes: they are harassed both for possessing stereotypically 
feminine traits that are devalued in the male-dominated workplace and for failing to conform to 
gender-defined norms dictating that women should not exhibit the qualities of strength and 
aggressiveness that are rewarded in the employment market.” Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, 
Simulated Sodomy and Other Forms of Heterosexual “Horseplay”: Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Workplace 
Gender Hierarchies and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before and After Oncale, 11 YALE J. L. & FEM. 155, 
164 (1999). If a woman dresses too “soft, frilly, and ornamental” she may not appear competent, and 
if she dresses too formal or business-like, she risks being perceived as inappropriately departing 
from accepted gender identifications. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2547, 2552. 
 119. Miller, supra note 22, at 1367. Even “the male dress prohibition, trivial as it may seem to 
most individuals, reflects and perpetuates gender-role expectations that men wear pants and only 
women, or sissies, wear skirts.” Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2571. 
 120. Id. at 2569. 
 121. Id. at 2570. 
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power and competence, “perpetuate man’s historically commanding status.”122 
Likewise, as noted by the Jespersen dissent, a policy that women wear makeup 
contains an implicit message that “women’s undoctored faces compare 
unfavorably to men’s . . . because of a cultural assumption—and gender-based 
stereotype—that women’s faces are incomplete, unattractive, or unprofessional 
without full makeup.”123 By enforcing such company policies, courts reinforce, 
rather than challenge, stereotypically gendered assumptions regarding proper 
dress and appearance and a woman’s role in the workplace.124 
2. Harm to Men 
A policy requiring men to conform to a certain image of masculinity can be 
equally restrictive. A dress code requiring men to wear suits and ties and women 
to wear skirts perpetuates a set of gender norms that feminize women and 
masculinize men,125 thereby punishing men for displaying devalued characteristics 
of femaleness and femininity. This hegemonic view of masculinity derives from 
standards of male “homosocial” interactions, which refers to the “nonsexual 
attractions held by men . . . for members of their own sex.”126 These standards 
include emotional detachment, competition, and the sexual objectification of 
women.127 First, emotional detachment serves to “maintain both clear individual 
identity boundaries and the norms of hegemonic masculinity.” This is so because 
for a man to share his feelings is to reveal weaknesses; withholding such feelings 
is to maintain control.128 Second, competition allows a man to support an identity 
based on separation and distinction and not on likeness and cooperation, 
facilitating hierarchy in relationships as opposed to symmetry.129 Finally, a man’s 
engagement in the sexual objectification of women facilitates this separative 
identity by distancing the self from all that is associated with being female, 
thereby maintaining male superiority.130 This objectification enhances the distance 
between the sexes, enabling men to depersonalize the oppression of women.131 
These standards work together to form the contours of what may be considered 
the masculine image.132 In general, discrimination against men based on this 
hegemonic norm is underpinned by the same stereotypes used in discrimination 
against women, gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and other groups because they do not 
look or act like they are supposed to according to their biological indicators. Thus, 
whether directed at women or at men, gender regulation perpetuates patterns of 
 
 122. Id. at 2571. 
 123. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (Pregerson, J., 
dissenting). 
 124. Bouchard, supra note 112, at 221; Klare, supra note 106, at 1419. 
 125. Franke, supra note 57, at 696. 
 126. Sharon R. Bird, Welcome to the Men’s Club: Homosociality and the Maintenance of Hegemonic 
Masculinity, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 120, 121 (1996). 
 127. Id. at 122. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id 
 130. Id. at 123. 
 131. Id. 
 132. While individual conceptions of masculinity may depart from this hegemonic norm, 
nonhegemonic meanings are “oppressed due to perceptions of ‘appropriate’ masculinity.” Id. at 127. 
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male domination and gender-based exclusion in the workplace. It ensures that 
women conform to stereotypical images of “who and what type[s] of workers 
‘women’ are supposed to be,”133 and that men “project the desired manliness” 
necessary to preserve the “masculinized image” of certain types of work.134 
Accordingly, both men and women can be harmed from such mandates, but for 
different historical reasons and with different social impact. 
B. Adopting an Expanded Definition of Sex: Discrimination Based on Gender 
Atypicality 
Even an appearance policy that is applied equally to men and women may 
burden members of both sexes who fail to conform to traditional gender norms. 
Appearances are deeply connected to identity;135 mandatory dress codes inhibit 
individual employees’ autonomy, restraining their ability to express their true 
identities. When employers force outward compliance with gender stereotypes, 
sexual identity is elided with sexual expression and behavior and any deviance 
from expected gender roles is punished. 
As discussed above, courts have interpreted “because of sex” in its 
broadest sense to mean not only biological sex, but also anything relating to 
gender, sexual or gender expression, behavior, anatomy, or identity. It is 
apparent from the sexual harassment and sex discrimination cases that Title VII 
encompasses not only conduct directed, for example, at women based on their 
biological status as women, but also conduct directed at women based on their 
failure to conform to stereotypical assumptions as to how women should look 
and act. In Price Waterhouse and the other lower court cases discussed above, the 
hostility experienced by the plaintiffs was not targeted at all males, or all 
females, as biologically-defined classes. Instead, harassment was directed 
towards men and women who exhibited certain traits, which were in tension 
with socially defined norms and expectations for appearance and demeanor 
based on their biological sex. 
Notwithstanding Price Waterhouse and its progeny, courts continue to 
permit dress codes that are based on gender stereotypes. In Jespersen, the court 
explicitly refused to apply Price Waterhouse, noting that case applies to 
“discrimination against an employee on the basis of that employee’s failure to 
dress and behave according to the stereotype corresponding with her gender,” 
but not specifically to “sex-differentiated appearance and grooming standards 
on its male and female employees.”136 The court emphasized that a sexual 
harassment claim for gender stereotyping is distinct from a claim of gender 
 
 133. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1754 (April 1998). 
 134. Id. at 1775 (“[M]en have a lot at stake in assuring a tight linkage between their work and their 
masculinity. It is crucial for many men to maintain control over the masculinized image of their work. If a 
job is to confer masculinity, it must be held by those who project the desired manliness.”); see also id. at 
n.472 (discussing ways in which men create and perpetuate idealized masculine images of their work). 
 135. Some have argued that “our behavior, dress and other ‘performances’ are at least to some 
degree constitutive of our identity.” See Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why 
Identity Performance Demands are Neither Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 300 (2005–2006) 
(critiquing articles by Kenji Yoshino, Devon Carbado, and Mitu Gulati). 
 136. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 409 F.3d 
1061 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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stereotyping in the context of appearance and grooming cases.137 In so doing, it 
failed to consider the fact that the makeup requirement made Jespersen feel 
“sick, degraded, exposed, and . . . forced her to be feminine,” and, in so doing, 
failed to account for the “harms associated with forced gender conformity for 
persons whose gender identity and expression are not shared by the judges.”138 
The Jespersen court, in effect, required a showing that all women were burdened, 
not just women like Jespersen who found the policy inconsistent with her 
gender identity. 
Scholars have overwhelmingly agreed that the Jespersen court’s 
interpretation of Price Waterhouse is strained and unjustified and that dress codes 
derived from socially constructed gender norms should be found to violate Title 
VII.139 The differences between the two plaintiffs are minimal: “Both cases 
involve a female employee, terminated or held back from advancement based 
on her failure to comply with stereotypes associated with her sex. Plaintiff 
Hopkins in Price Waterhouse failed to dress and act femininely enough, while 
Plaintiff Jespersen failed to wear makeup as a ‘proper woman’ should.”140 There 
seems to be no justification for finding that harassing someone because of her 
 
 137. Id.; see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874, 875 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(applying Price Waterhouse where male restaurant host was regularly mocked and tormented for 
failing to conform to male stereotypes, but refusing to specify whether Price Waterhouse applies to 
gender-based distinctions such as dress and grooming requirements). But see Carroll v. Talman Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1032–33 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying the unequal burdens test, 
but also recognizing that appearance codes justified by “offensive stereotypes [are] prohibited by 
Title VII”). 
 138. Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t Make the Man (or Woman), But Gender Identity Might, 15 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90, 113 (2006). 
 139. Research revealed no law review article espousing the unequal burdens test as applied. See, 
e.g., Bartlett, supra note 8 (arguing that reliance on community norms in application of the unequal 
burdens test perpetuates harmful stereotypes); Bouchard, supra note 112, at 205 (arguing that the 
“outdated unequal burdens test” fails to adequately consider the gender stereotypes implicated by 
employer appearance policies); Cruz, supra note 36 (arguing that the unequal burdens test reinforces 
social division and stereotypical differences between men and women); Kelly, supra note 36 (arguing 
that the unequal burden test fails to account for intangible burdens imposed on women by employer 
appearance standards); Klare, supra note 106 (advocating “appearance autonomy” and arguing that 
dress codes that distinguish between men and women on the basis of commonly accepted 
community standards of appearance are sexist and patriarchal and allow employers to impose 
onerous and discriminatory attractiveness standards upon women so long as there is not a greater 
burden on them than their male co-workers); Miller, supra note 22, at 1358 (arguing that the unequal 
burdens test, which requires weighing and comparing the burdens imposed on each sex, is 
ineffective because courts fail to consider sexual stereotyping in grooming standards, the most 
common form of harmful discrimination); Raskin, supra note 8, at 267 (arguing that Price Waterhouse 
should be applied to sex-specific employer dress codes that are otherwise “neutral,” as sex-based 
appearance policies reinforce the oppressive social system); Recent Case: Title VII—Sex 
Discrimination—Ninth Circuit Holds that Women Can be Required to Wear Makeup as a Condition of 
Employment—Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2429, 2435–36 (2005) (taking issue with the reasoning of Jespersen and arguing that appearance 
standards based on conformity to sexual stereotypes should be impermissible based on Price 
Waterhouse). 
 140. Bouchard, supra note 112, at 219. 
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failure to conform to sex stereotypes is unacceptable while firing her for the 
same reason is acceptable.141 
Title VII sexual harassment cases recognize that most important differences 
between men and women are grounded in gender-normativity and the 
behavioral aspects of sexual identity, not in biology. It is gender and the 
hierarchy of gender differences which transform an anatomical difference into a 
socially relevant distinction. Accordingly, under the broader definition of sex, 
employer-mandated appearance codes, like the one in Jespersen requiring 
women to dress like women and men to dress like men, strike at the heart of a 
person’s gender identity and, therefore, inherently discriminate on the basis of 
sex. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For many, the harm from sex-specific dress codes is de minimis: shave your 
beard, cut your hair, wear the uniform. But for some, forced gender conformity 
is problematic beyond the tangible, striking at the heart of a person’s identity. 
Though courts have long recognized the harm from gender identity 
discrimination in other contexts, forced conformity to normative stereotypes 
about gender expression is considered acceptable in the context of appearance 
codes. Such codes are typically justified on the basis of pervasive community 
expectations—expectations that reinforce and freeze gender stereotypes that 
view males as the dominant and competent sex, while relegating females to their 
traditional domestic, sexual, and reproductive roles. 
The unequal burdens test requires courts to compare the burden imposed 
by sex-specific grooming and dress regulations on men and women, and strikes 
down a policy only where the burden on one sex is greater than the burden 
imposed on the other. But sex-specific appearance codes, by their very nature, 
invoke and perpetuate gender-based stereotypes that are harmful to women and 
penalize those who diverge from prescribed gender roles. By mandating 
adherence to a gender paradigm, dress codes can suppress sexual autonomy 
which in turn produces oppressive sex and gender identities. When courts 
sanction gender-mandated attire they take a narrow view of sexual identity; 
they bifurcate personhood into “male” and “female” components and 
universally attribute distinct characteristics to men and women without 
variation. The paradigm of genital identity establishes and maintains the 
hierarchical differentiation between men and women.142 Thus, when courts 
accept the validity of dress policies based on biological sexual differences, they 
perpetuate stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and ignore normative 
gender ideology, resulting in devaluation of people who are feminized.143 
 
 141. See Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1084 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Kelly, supra note 36, at 61 
(noting the irony in having a case’s outcome “turn on whether the company actually instituted a 
grooming policy based on gender stereotypes or used considerations of gender stereotyping in 
making employment decisions”). 
 142. Allan C. Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 875–
76 (1985). 
 143. Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual 
Orientation to its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 170 (1996). 
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The unequal burdens test had an admirable goal of preventing the sexual 
exploitation of women in the workplace by prohibiting the imposition of rules 
requiring women to dress in provocative or sexy uniforms to attract customers. 
Indeed, in many cases, this test has led to fair and logical results. For example, 
the test made sense in Frank v. United Airlines,144 where United Airlines imposed 
more stringent weight restrictions on female flight attendants than on male 
flight attendants, given that the policy directly imposed disparate standards for 
men and women. However, where standards are not capable of direct 
comparison—such as where women are required to wear makeup and men are 
required to keep their hair short—the test breaks down. In such cases, courts 
permit the regulations, as long as the burden on men and women is equal. This 
stands in stark contrast with the burgeoning case law prohibiting workplace 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity and expression. 
Sexual harassment law has been through the machinations of the “because 
of sex” causation requirement in the parallel context of the equal opportunity 
harasser. After more than a quarter of a century of jurisprudence in that area, 
courts are headed in the right direction by recognizing the sex-based nature of 
harassing conduct that affects both men and women but in different ways. Can 
dress code jurisprudence be far behind? 
 
 144. 216 F.3d 845, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
